Iran
UK should finally acknowledge role in 1953 Iran coup, says David Owen
Former foreign secretary says doing so would benefit both reform movement in country and Britain’s credibility
The UK should finally acknowledge its leading role in the 1953 coup that toppled Iran’s last democratically elected leader, for the sake of Britain’s credibility and the Iranian reform movement, a former foreign secretary has said.
The US formally admitted its role 10 years ago with the declassification of a large volume of intelligence documents, which made clear that the ousting of the elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosadegh, 70 years ago this week was a joint CIA-MI6 endeavour. The formal UK government position is to refuse to comment on an intelligence matter.
On the 70th anniversary of the coup on Tuesday, David Owen, who was foreign secretary from 1977 to 1979, told the Guardian: “There are good reasons for acknowledging the UK’s role with the US in 1953 in overthrowing democratic developments. By admitting that we were wrong to do so and damaged the steps that were developing towards a democratic Iran, we make reforms now a little more likely.”
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شماره و گروه درس: 02-2101628
نام درس: مسائل اقتصاد سياسي انرژي در ايران
زمان ارائۀ درس(ت): يك شنبه ۱۰:۰۰-۱۲:۰۰
زمان امتحان: (۱۴۰۲/۱۱/۰۲) ساعت: ۱۳:۰۰-۱۵:۰۰
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https://eitaa.com/class50
Attendance&Participation(DrPirouz).pdf
حجم:
56.2K
شماره و گروه درس: 02-2101628
نام درس: مسائل اقتصاد سياسي انرژي در ايران
زمان ارائۀ درس(ت): يك شنبه ۱۰:۰۰-۱۲:۰۰
زمان امتحان: (۱۴۰۲/۱۱/۰۲) ساعت: ۱۳:۰۰-۱۵:۰۰
فرمهای مربوط به تاخیر، حضور ناقص، عدم حضور و پرسش در کلاس. (همیشه یک برگ پرینت شده همراه داشته باشید تا اگر کاری پیش اومد بابتش نمره از دست ندید و اگر سئوالی داشتید یادتون نره).
ThePoliticalEconomyOfNuclearEnergy2019(DrPirouz).pdf
حجم:
2.18M
📖 Basu, Dipak; Miroshnik, Viktoria W. The Political Economy Of Nuclear Energy: Prospects And Retrospect. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan / Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 2019.
تا حالا 7 - 8 - 10 نفر شوخی یا جدی درخواست (Auditing) کلاسها را کردند هر کدوم هم یه چیزی گفتند.
Auditing a class entails enrolling in a course for no grade and no credit.
اگر دانشگاه هویتشون را تایید کنه و بهشون نامه بده از نظر من اشکالی نداره بیان سر کلاس مشروط به این که هر هفته تکالیف کلاس را انجام بدن و با خودشون بیارن!!! چرا؟! هیچی - میخوام ببینم واقعا این همه آدم علاقمند داریم!!!
هدایت شده از دانشگاه تهران
🔹آغاز بازه زمانی حذف و اضافه در دانشگاه تهران | اخذ درس «یادگیری تجربی» ویژه دانشجویان مقطع کارشناسی در بازه زمانی حذف و اضافه ممکن شد
https://news.ut.ac.ir/fa/news/37101
@UT_NEWSLINE
Pakistan's A.Q. Khan: My Nuclear Manifesto
By A. Q. Khan On 5/16/2011 at 6:00 AM EDT
https://www.newsweek.com/pakistans-aq-khan-my-nuclear-manifesto-67529
Don't overlook the fact that no nuclear-capable country has been subjected to aggression or occupied, or had its borders redrawn. Had Iraq and Libya been nuclear powers, they wouldn't have been destroyed in the way we have seen recently. If we had had nuclear capability before 1971, we would not have lost half of our country—present-day Bangladesh—after disgraceful defeat.
There is a total misconception about the money spent on our nuclear program. When we started, our budget was just $10 million per year, increasing to $20 million per year when at full capacity, including all salaries, transport, medical care, housing, utilities, and purchases of technical equipment and materials. This is but half the cost of a modern fighter aircraft. The propaganda about spending exorbitant sums on the nuclear program circulated by ignorant, often foreign-paid, Pakistanis has no substance.
هدایت شده از Technology
Newsweek - World
Pakistan's A.Q. Khan: My Nuclear Manifesto
By A. Q. Khan On 5/16/11 at 6:00 AM EDT
https://www.newsweek.com/pakistans-aq-khan-my-nuclear-manifesto-67529
Pakistan's nuclear program has always been a target for Western propaganda and false accusations. I would like to make it clear that it was an Indian nuclear explosion in May 1974 that prompted our nuclear program, motivating me to return to Pakistan to help create a credible nuclear deterrent and save my country from Indian nuclear blackmail.
After 15 years in Europe with invaluable experience in enrichment technology, I came to Pakistan in December 1975 and was given the task of producing nuclear weapons by then–prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. On Dec. 10, 1984, I informed Gen. Zia-ul-Haq that we could explode a device at a week's notice, whenever he so desired. We achieved credible nuclear capacity by the second half of the '80s, and the delivery system was perfected in the early '90s. For a country that couldn't produce bicycle chains to have become a nuclear and missile power within a short span—and in the teeth of Western opposition—was quite a feat.
The question of how many weapons are required for credible deterrence against India is purely academic. India is engaged in a massive program to cope with the nonexistent threat posed by China and in order to become a superpower...